

Valuing water quality tradeoffs at the farm level: An integrated approach

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Abstract

This study evaluates the tradeoff between agricultural production and water quality for individual producers using an integrated economic-biophysical hybrid genetic algorithm. We apply a multi-input, multi-output profit maximization model to detailed farm-level production data from the Oregon Willamette Valley to predict each producer's response to a targeted fertilizer tax policy. Their resulting production decisions are included in a biophysical model of basin-level soil and water quality. We use a hybrid genetic algorithm to integrate the economic and biophysical models into one multiobjective optimization problem, the joint maximization of farm profits and minimization of Nitrate runoff resulting from fertilizer usage. We then measure the tradeoffs between maximum profit and Nitrogen loading for individual farms, subject to the fertilizer tax policy. We find considerable

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variation in tradeoff values across the basin, which could be used to better target incentives for reducing Nitrogen loading to agricultural producers.

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1 Introduction

2 Environmental policy analysis, particularly the analysis of policies that are
3 targeted to a distinct group of decision makers or to a particular geographic
4 region, can be refined by integrating economic and biophysical models. Ex-
5 amples of integrated economic and biophysical models for agriculture include
6 modeling the biophysical outcomes of alternative economic scenarios (Secchi
7 and Babcock, 2007; Jha et al., 2010) or the solution to a single-objective
8 economic optimization model (Schönert et al., 2011; Uthes et al., 2010) and
9 linking both single and multiobjective economic optimization models to bio-
10 physical models in a model chain (Hillyer et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2002; Moore
11 and Tindall, 2005; Rabotyagov et al., 2010c; Volk et al., 2008; Whittaker et
12 al., 2005).

13 In the model chain approach, information passes only in one direction,
14 so that the optimal decision at any point in the chain is constrained by any
15 previous decisions or outcomes in the chain. A simultaneous optimization of
16 all objectives can inform the calculation of tradeoffs between multiple objec-
17 tives. Several studies employ genetic algorithms to simultaneously optimize
18 multiple objectives by allowing information to pass between each objective

19 in both directions (Bekele and Nicklow, 2005; Arabi et al., 2006; Rabotyagov
20 et al, 2010a; 2010b). These studies illustrate the use of genetic algorithms to
21 calculate the Pareto optimal frontier for both economic and environmental
22 objectives.

23 We build on the use of genetic algorithms for agri-environmental policy
24 analysis by integrating a realistic biophysical model with a detailed economic
25 optimization model that more fully endogenizes each producer’s response to
26 the search for an optimal targeted policy. Our use of genetic algorithm
27 methods to more freely integrate the economic and biophysical models is
28 detailed in a related study of targeted policy design (Whittaker et al., 2014).

29 This approach contributes to the existing literature in several important
30 ways. First, we include both a detailed, spatially explicit biophysical model
31 and a complete model of profit maximization, with minimal restrictions to
32 solution values and without imposing a production technology relationship.
33 Second, we apply an adaptive modeling framework to allow for two-way
34 feedback between our economic and environmental objectives. This frame-
35 work fully endogenizes fertilizer usage, making economic cost endogenous
36 and better updating the search for the efficient tax rate. The resulting pol-
37 icy generates a set of Pareto optimal tradeoffs that can be evaluated across
38 objectives. Third, we evaluate the resulting tradeoffs for individual produc-
39 ers, in addition to the aggregate basin-level tradeoffs.

40 This integrated economic-biophysical model simulates a rich set of agent-
41 level decisions, made in response to the Pareto optimal policy and corre-
42 sponding environmental outcomes that can be used to evaluate tradeoffs
43 at the individual level. We examine these decisions for a set of grass seed

44 farms situated in the Calapoovia River watershed, a predominantly agricul-
45 tural watershed in Oregon’s Willamette Valley. We also make use of detailed
46 microlevel farm production data, which further enhances the evaluation of
47 individual tradeoffs between farm profit maximization and watershed Nitro-
48 gen loading.

49 To value these tradeoffs, we jointly model the profit-maximizing crop pro-
50 duction and Nitrogen loading levels, simulated by the economic-biophysical
51 model, as outputs in a production process using the directional output dis-
52 tance function (Chambers et al., 1996). In economic production theory, the
53 directional output distance function is dual to the revenue function, which
54 we exploit to derive shadow price estimates for Nitrogen loading in the basin
55 (Ball et al., 2004; Färe et al., 2005; 2006).

56 We find that the tradeoff between farm profit and Nitrogen loading varies
57 greatly across farmers in the watershed, most likely due to differences in soil
58 quality and location in the basin’s hydrologic network. In practice, man-
59 agers could use this information to target incentives for fertilizer reduction
60 or reduced nitrate runoff, such as easement payments or funding for best
61 management practices, to farms that have a lower opportunity cost of re-
62 ducing eventual Nitrogen loading in the basin. Randhir and Shriver (2009)
63 demonstrate the potential gains from using multi-attribute shadow price val-
64 ues to target restoration incentives across a watershed. Moreover, analysis
65 of the tradeoff at the farm level offers a better picture of the distribution of
66 costs across producers in the region. This distribution may be of concern
67 for equity considerations and could affect the feasibility of implementing
68 prospective agri-environmental policies in practice.

69 **2 Multiobjective Optimization Problem**

70 We characterize the joint, and often competing, objectives of farm-level profit
71 maximization and basin-level Nitrogen loading as a multiobjective optimiza-
72 tion problem. These objectives are constrained by the farm production
73 technology and by the biophysical processes that determine the fate and
74 transport of Nitrogen through the basin. The solution includes an optimal
75 fertilizer usage and ‘green tax’ rate targeted to the farm level.

76 We use a hybrid genetic algorithm (HGA), following Whittaker et al.
77 (2014), to solve over both objectives. We then use the solution values to
78 estimate a frontier for crop production and Nitrogen loading that allows us
79 to measure the economic and environmental tradeoffs for individual farms in
80 the basin.

81 Because the solution set of optimal tax rates and fertilizer usage depends
82 on the profit maximizing behavior of individual producers, we formulate the
83 multiobjective problem as a bilevel optimization (Bard, 1998). A bilevel
84 optimization nests one optimization inside of another, so that the solution
85 to the outer non-nested optimization, typically referred to as the upper level,
86 depends on the solution to the inner nested optimization, typically referred
87 to as the lower level (Sinha et al., 2013). In our case, the joint maximization
88 of total profit and minimization of basin-level Nitrogen constitutes the upper
89 level while producer level profit maximization makes up the lower level.

90 For tax rate t and fertilizer input x_N , we represent the nested nature of
91 this problem in general form, following Sinha et al. (2013) as

$$\begin{aligned}
& \max_{t, x_N} F(t, x_N) = [\pi(t, x_N), -N(x_N)] & (1) \\
& \text{s.t. } x_N \in \operatorname{argmax}_{x_N} \begin{cases} \pi(t, x_N) = py(x_N) - w_N x_N - t w_N x_N \\ \pi(t, x_N) \geq 0 \end{cases} \\
& x_N \geq 0, t \geq 0,
\end{aligned}$$

92 where N denotes basin-level Nitrogen loading, π represents farm profit, and
93 w_N is the market price for fertilizer.

94 We note several important points underlying this general representation.
95 First, the optimal tax rates and fertilizer usage for total profit and Nitrogen
96 loading at the upper level depend on how individual producers respond to
97 the tax, in terms of fertilizer use, at the lower level. The profit-maximizing
98 fertilizer usage, in turn, depends on the production technology. Second, total
99 Nitrogen loading at the upper level also depends on individual fertilizer usage
100 in response to the tax at the lower level, as well as the spatial distribution
101 of fertilizer usage by producers in the watershed. The spatial dynamics of
102 fertilizer usage and Nitrogen loading are governed by biophysical processes
103 in the basin. Third, the nested nature of this problem, coupled with multiple
104 production inputs and many profit-maximizing producers, makes the solu-
105 tion to (1) complex. We employ a hybrid genetic algorithm to iteratively
106 optimize the lower and upper levels of our problem. We explain the pro-
107 duction technology specification, biophysical model and genetic algorithm
108 solution method in more detail below.

109 **2.1 Profit maximization at the farm level**

110 In our economic model, each producer chooses inputs and outputs to maxi-
 111 mize profit subject to the production technology and the fertilizer tax rate
 112 policy. We use nonparametric linear programming methods known as data
 113 envelopment analysis (DEA) (Charnes et al., 1978) to estimate the produc-
 114 tion technology and to simulate the profit maximization decision of each
 115 farm. In the DEA representation of the production technology, each of the
 116 K producers uses inputs $x = (x_1, \dots, x_N)$ to produce outputs $y = (y_1, \dots, y_M)$.
 117 The production technology T is defined as $T = \{(x, y) : x \text{ can produce } y\}$.

118 The corresponding DEA representation of the technology is

$$\begin{aligned}
 T = \{(x, y) : y_m &\leq \sum_{k=1}^K z^k y_m^k, & m = 1, \dots, M, & \quad (2) \\
 x_n &\geq \sum_{k=1}^K z^k x_n^k, & n = 1, \dots, N, \\
 \sum_{k=1}^K z^k &\leq 1, \\
 z^k &\geq 0\},
 \end{aligned}$$

119 where the variables z^k , known as intensity variables in this framework, are
 120 constrained to allow for non-increasing returns to scale. Given input prices
 121 $w = (w_1, \dots, w_N)$ and output prices $p = (p_1, \dots, p_M)$, the profit of the k^{th}
 122 farm is computed as the solution to

$$\begin{aligned}
\pi^k(p, w) = \max & \sum_{m=1}^M p_m y_m^k - \sum_{n=1}^N w_n x_n^k, & (3) \\
\text{s.t.} & \sum_{k=1}^K z^k y_m^k \geq y_m, & m = 1, \dots, M, \\
& \sum_{k=1}^K z^k x_n^k \leq x_n, & n = 1, \dots, N \\
& \sum_{k=1}^K z^k \leq 1, \\
& z^k \geq 0, & k = 1, \dots, K.
\end{aligned}$$

123 Figure 1 illustrates profit maximization for a DEA representation of a
124 single input / single output production technology with three observations,
125 a, b and c. These frontier observations also lie on the profit lines, π_1^* , π_2^*
126 and π_3^* , which represent maximum profit levels for input and output prices
127 $\{(p_1, w_1), (p_2, w_2), (p_3, w_3)\}$.

To simulate each producer's response to a 'green' tax policy, we add
a targeted proportional tax to the profit maximization model in (3). The
objective function under the targeted tax, t^k , on Nitrogen fertilizer, the N^{th}
input, is

$$\pi^k(p, w) = \max \sum_{m=1}^M p_m y_m^k - \sum_{n=1}^{N-1} w_n x_n^k - t^k w_N x_N^k, \quad (4)$$

128 subject to the technology representation in (2) and (3). Here the tax rate
129 for each farm, t^k , is multiplied by the quantity and price of the N^{th} input,




Figure 1: DEA Profit Maximization for Three Different Price Ratios

130 Nitrogen fertilizer. Note that a tax value of $t = 1$ is equivalent to having no
 131 tax on fertilizer and that a given policy consists of K different tax rates for
 132 each of the K farms.

133 2.2 Nitrogen loading in the basin

134 The environmental objective in this case is to minimize Nitrogen loading in
 135 the basin resulting from profit-maximizing fertilizer use. We use the Soil
 136 and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) (Arnold et al., 1998) to specify the
 137 environmental objective. SWAT is a biophysical model that can be used to
 138 simulate the effects of agricultural production processes at the river basin
 139 scale (Arnold et al., 2012). The model divides the entire watershed into
 140 subbasins, where each subbasin is further divided into hydrological response

141 units (HRUs), which represent unique combinations of topography, land use
142 and soil properties. Farm-level production decisions in each of the HRUs
143 can then be included to model the spatial distribution of Nitrogen loadings
144 throughout the watershed.

145 We use the digital elevation model ArcSWAT, which adds a GIS interface
146 to SWAT, to input and designate land use, soil, weather, groundwater, water
147 use management, pond and stream water quality data. SWAT simulates
148 hydrology, soil erosion, plant growth, as well as multiple fate and transport
149 processes, including that of Nitrogen. This framework is specifically designed
150 to simulate the environmental effects of agricultural production practices,
151 thus providing a method to test the effectiveness of agri-environmental policy
152 (Arnold et al., 2012). SWAT is widely used and numerous studies apply it
153 specifically to agri-environmental policy analysis (Bekele and Nicklow, 2005;
154 Richardson et al., 2008; Rabotyagov et al, 2010b)

155 **2.3 The Hybrid Genetic Algorithm**

156 We use a genetic algorithm to solve the multiobjective optimization problem
157 for the case of a targeted environmental policy, in this case a proportional
158 Nitrogen fertilizer tax. This problem is computationally intensive, but rela-
159 tively easy to implement with parallel execution (Whittaker et al., 2009).

160 A genetic algorithm (GA) is an iterative algorithm based on retention of
161 the best or ‘fittest’ members of a population until a stopping condition is
162 satisfied (Goldberg, 1989). In an optimization application, the GA consists of
163 an initial randomly generated population that is evaluated for fitness using
164 an objective function, a test for convergence, and application of the GA

165 operations of selection, crossover and mutation. These elements are followed
166 iteratively until an optimum is obtained.

167 Although GAs generally find promising solution regions quickly, conver-
168 gence to an optimum can be much slower. In response, a hybrid genetic
169 algorithm (HGA) model adds a local search method to speed convergence
170 (Sinha and Goldberg, 2003). Figure 2 illustrates the HGA used to solve our
171 maximum-profit and minimum-Nitrogen loading problem.

172 We use the non-dominated sort genetic algorithm (NSGA-II) (Deb et
173 al., 2002) to assign a fitness value to each individual in the GA population,
174 based on the evaluation of the individual for each objective. The result is an
175 estimate of the Pareto optimal set of our objectives, farm profit and Nitrogen
176 loading, at convergence. In our case, a linear program for the DEA model is
177 solved in the evaluation step, which limits the space that is searched by the
178 GA. The DEA results are then passed to NSGA-II, which finds the set of
179 values available across the Pareto optimal frontier. It is important to note
180 that this HGA uses information from both the economic and environmental
181 models used in the integrated simulation of the tax policy during the op-
182 timization. Whittaker et al. (2014) provide more computational detail on
183 implementing the HGA.

184 **3 Evaluating the Individual Tradeoffs**

185 The HGA is specified to maximize total basin-wide profit while also min-
186 imizing total basin-wide Nitrogen loadings. However, individual tax rates
187 are applied to each farm. Therefore, for this targeted tax policy, it is also




Figure 2: The hybrid genetic algorithm

188 important to understand the tradeoffs that exist for individual producers.
189 To evaluate the tradeoff between Nitrogen loading and crop production at
190 the farm level, we first calculate each farm’s share of total basin Nitrogen
191 loading as a function of their fertilizer application rate and HRU location.
192 We then use a directional distance function approach to model individual Ni-
193 trogen loading as an undesirable output, produced jointly with the desirable
194 output, crop production.

195 **3.1 The underlying theory**

196 We let $P(x)$ denote the feasible output set for the vector of farm outputs
197 $y = (y_1, \dots, y_M)$ and undesirable outputs $u = (u_1, \dots, u_J)$ given inputs $x =$
198 (x_1, \dots, x_N) , so that

$$P(x) = \{(y, u) : x \text{ can produce } (y, u)\}. \quad (5)$$

199 In this case, y represents each farm’s crop production output, u its Nitrogen
200 loading and x the vector of inputs, including acreage, labor, equipment and
201 fertilizer.

202 We make the standard assumption that $P(x)$ is compact and convex,
203 acknowledging that output is scarce and thus, tradeoffs exist at the frontier.
204 We also assume that good and bad outputs are weakly disposable, which
205 allows for their proportional scaling up or down over $P(x)$, meaning that for
206 $(y, u) \in P(x)$ and $0 \leq \theta \leq 1$, $(\theta y, \theta u) \in P(x)$. We relax the usual assump-
207 tion of null jointness, that if $(y, u) \in P(x)$ and $u = 0$, then $y = 0$, due to
208 its violation in practice by one of the farms in our study. Given these as-

209 sumptions, we use the directional output distance function to represent the
 210 feasible output set (Chambers et al., 1996), as well as individual measures of
 211 performance. Figure 4 illustrates the feasible output set for the joint produc-
 212 tion of good and bad output and the directional output distance function,
 213 defined as

$$\vec{D}_O(x, y, u; g_y, g_u) = \max \{ \beta : [(y + \beta g_y, u - \beta g_u)] \in P(x) \}, \quad (6)$$

214 where $(g_y \in \mathbb{R}_+^M, g_u \in \mathbb{R}_+^J)$ is a directional vector that specifies the si-
 215 multaneous expansion of desirable output and contraction of undesirable
 216 output. This model measures each observation's distance, in a particular
 217 direction, to the production frontier. Thus, for observations on the fron-
 218 tier, $\vec{D}_O(x, y, u; g_y, g_u) = 0$, and for any observation below the frontier,
 219 $\vec{D}_O(x, y, u; g_y, g_u) > 0$. Individual performance deteriorates with distance
 220 to the frontier, so that the directional output distance value can be inter-
 221 preted as a measure of inefficiency for each observation.

222 The directional output distance function can be used to account for the
 223 undesirable nature of some outputs of a production process, in this case Ni-
 224 trogen loading, by specifying a negative direction for those outputs (Chung
 225 et al., 1997). This enables the simultaneous expansion of desirable output
 226 and contraction of undesirable output in the measurement of performance.
 227 The properties of the directional output distance function follow from the
 228 assumptions made to characterize $P(x)$, and include Representation, Mono-
 229 tonicity and Translation. Chambers et al. (1996) prove these properties for
 230 the input oriented case and we outline their use for estimation purposes in




Figure 3: The Directional Output Distance Function for Desirable Output, y , and Undesirable Output, u

231 the next section.

232 We use this model to construct the feasible output set for crop production
 233 and Nitrogen loading, which allows us to measure the physical tradeoffs for
 234 individual producers in the watershed. Given the market value of grass
 235 seed, it is also possible to value these tradeoffs in monetary terms (Färe
 236 et al., 2001; 2005; 2006) by exploiting the duality that exists between the
 237 directional output distance function and the revenue function,

$$R(x, p, q) = \max_{y, u} \{py - pu : (y, u) \in P(x)\}, \quad (7)$$

238 where $p = (p_1, \dots, p_M) \in \mathfrak{R}_+^M$ is the vector of output prices corresponding to
 239 y and $q = (q_1, \dots, q_J) \in \mathfrak{R}_+^J$ is the vector of output prices corresponding to
 240 u . By definition,

$$R(x, p, q) \geq py - qu, \forall (y, u) \in P(x), \quad (8)$$

241 and this, along with the definition of the directional output distance function
 242 from (6) and the representation property imply

$$\begin{aligned} R(x, p, q) &\geq (p, q)(y + \vec{D}_O(x, y, u; g_y, g_u)g_y, u - \vec{D}_O(x, y, u; g_y, g_u)g_u) \\ &\geq (py - qu) + \vec{D}_O(x, y, u; g_y, g_u)pg_y + \vec{D}_O(x, y, u; g_y, g_u)qg_u. \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

243 Rearranging terms in (9),

$$\vec{D}_O(x, y, u; g_y, g_u) \leq \frac{R(x, p, q) - (py - qu)}{(pg_y + qg_u)}. \quad (10)$$

244 The directional output distance function can then be recovered from the
 245 right hand side in (10) as the solution to

$$\vec{D}_O(x, y, u; g_y, g_u) = \min_{p, q} \frac{R(x, p, q) - (py - qu)}{(pg_y + qg_u)}. \quad (11)$$

246 The vector of shadow prices is derived by applying the envelope theorem to
 247 (11), so that

$$\nabla_u \vec{D}_O(x, y, u; g_y, g_u) = \frac{q}{(pg_y + qg_u)} \geq 0, \quad (12)$$

248 and

$$\nabla_y \vec{D}_O(x, y, u; g_y, g_u) = \frac{-p}{(pg_y + qg_u)} \leq 0. \quad (13)$$

249 For a single observation, the shadow price ratio is

$$-\frac{q_j}{p_m} = \frac{\partial \vec{D}_O(x, y, u; g_y, g_u) / \partial u_j}{\partial \vec{D}_O(x, y, u; g_y, g_u) / \partial y_m}, \forall m \in M \text{ and } \forall j \in J. \quad (14)$$

250 The shadow price ratio values the tradeoff in relative terms between the
251 desirable and undesirable output. If at least one of the outputs y_m in $P(x)$
252 is marketed, in this case crop production, the shadow price of the nonmar-
253 keted undesirable output, in this case Nitrogen loading, can be recovered in
254 absolute terms as

$$q_j = -p_m \frac{\partial \vec{D}_O(x, y, u; g_y, g_u) / \partial u_j}{\partial \vec{D}_O(x, y, u; g_y, g_u) / \partial y_m}, \forall m \in M \text{ and } \forall j \in J. \quad (15)$$

255 We note that in this application, the desirable output, crop production,
256 is measured in terms of total sales, so that a unit of output is \$1.00. This
257 normalizes the price of output, p_m , to equal \$1.00 as well.

258 3.2 Estimating the tradeoffs in practice

259 To compute the marginal effects and shadow prices of each output in prac-
260 tice requires parameterization of the output frontier. In choosing a functional
261 form for that parameterization, we are guided by the properties of the di-
262 rectional output distance function. Only two forms are known to satisfy the
263 translation property, and of these, only the quadratic form contains the first
264 order parameters necessary to compute marginal effects (Färe and Lund-
265 berg, 2006). More recently, Färe et al. (2010) use Monte Carlo simulations
266 to demonstrate the ability in practice of the quadratic directional output
267 distance function to characterize the output set. The quadratic (also as

268 in Aigner and Chu, 1968) directional output distance function (Färe et al.,
 269 2001; 2005; 2006) is estimated as

$$\begin{aligned}
 \vec{D}_O(x, y, u; g_y, g_u) = & \alpha_0 + \sum_{n=1}^N \alpha_n x_n + \sum_{m=1}^M \beta_m y_m + \sum_{j=1}^J \gamma_j u_j \quad (16) \\
 & + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{n=1}^N \sum_{n'=1}^N \alpha_{nn'} x_n x_{n'} + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{m=1}^M \sum_{m'=1}^M \beta_{mm'} y_m y_{m'} \\
 & + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j=1}^J \sum_{j'=1}^J \gamma_{jj'} u_j u_{j'} + \sum_{n=1}^N \sum_{m=1}^M \delta_{nm} x_n y_m \\
 & + \sum_{n=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^J \nu_{nj} x_n u_j + \sum_{m=1}^M \sum_{j=1}^J \mu_{mj} y_m u_j.
 \end{aligned}$$

270 We estimate the quadratic directional output distance function as a con-
 271 strained linear programming problem, choosing the parameters to minimize
 272 each observation's distance to the frontier. The solution to this problem, the
 273 optimal parameter values and \vec{D}_O^k minimize

$$\sum_{k=1}^K \vec{D}_O^k(x^k, y^k, u^k; g_y, g_u) \quad (17)$$

274 subject to

275 i. Representation

$$\vec{D}_O^k(x^k, y^k, u^k; g_y, g_u) \geq 0, k = 1, \dots, K,$$

276 ii. Monotonicity

$$\frac{\partial \vec{D}_O^k(x^k, y^k, u^k; g_y, g_u)}{\partial y_m^k} \leq 0, m = 1, \dots, M, k = 1, \dots, K,$$

277

$$\frac{\partial \vec{D}_O^k(x^k, y^k, u^k; g_y, g_u)}{\partial u_j^k} \geq 0, j = 1, \dots, J, k = 1, \dots, K,$$

278

$$\frac{\partial \vec{D}_O^k(x^k, y^k, u^k; g_y, g_u)}{\partial x_n^k} \geq 0, n = 1, \dots, N, k = 1, \dots, K,$$

279 iii. Translation

$$\vec{D}_O(x, y + \alpha g_y; g_y) = \vec{D}_O(x, y; g_y) - \alpha$$

280 The constraints ensure that the quadratic form satisfies the properties
 281 of the directional output distance function. The first constraint satisfies the
 282 representation property by requiring all observations to either lie on or be-
 283 low the output frontier. The second constraint states that an increase in
 284 any desirable output, a decrease in any undesirable output, or a decrease in
 285 any input can only reduce an observation's distance to the output frontier,
 286 which guarantees monotonicity for both inputs and outputs. The third con-
 287 straint imposes the translation property, restricting the parameters so that
 288 additional output in the g_{y_m} direction reduces an observation's distance to
 289 the frontier by an equal amount. A reduction of undesirable output in the
 290 g_{u_j} direction decreases an observation's distance to the frontier by an equal
 291 amount. The final constraint adds the symmetry condition for cross-input
 292 and cross-output effects.

293 4 Empirical Application

294 We use the HGA to maximize profit and minimize Nitrogen loading for a set
295 of 87 real grass seed farms in the Calapooia river watershed, a tributary of
296 the Willamette river basin west of the Cascades Mountain range in Oregon.
297 These farms are situated in the lower portion of the watershed, which has a
298 drainage area of 682 km^2 . The environmental effects of agricultural land use
299 in the Lower Calapooia have been previously studied as part of the USDA
300 Conservation Effects Assessment Project (CEAP) (Confessor and Whittaker,
301 2007; Mueller-Warrant et al., 2012). The vast majority of the watershed is
302 used for agricultural crop production (83 %) with most of this in grass seed
303 farming. This is followed by hay/ pasture/ range areas (12 %). Wetlands,
304 water bodies and urban areas comprise the remaining area. A recent National
305 Water Quality Assessment of the watershed identifies nitrate Nitrogen as a
306 particular concern, due to the increasing trend of stream and groundwater
307 concentrations in excess of human health and aquatic life standards (Mueller-
308 Warrant et al., 2012; Dubrovsky et al., 2010). Recent sampling confirms that
309 these Nitrogen concentrations vary greatly across the basin, even for areas
310 with over 90% of land in agriculture (Mueller-Warrant et al., 2012), making
311 this a particularly interesting case to consider for policy targeting.

312 4.1 The SWAT application

313 We use the SWAT model to divide the study area into 381 subbasins and
314 533 HRUs. We calibrated the SWAT model with daily streamflow data
315 at the basin outlet Albany, OR, obtained from the U.S. Geological Survey




Figure source: Confessor and Whittaker (2007)

Figure 4: The SWAT delineation of the Lower Calapooia watershed

316 (USGS) National Water Information System (NWIS) website. We used soil
 317 data from the SSURGO state soil geographic database for Oregon, obtained
 318 from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Natural Resources Con-
 319 servation Service (NRCS), land use data from the USGS National Water
 320 Quality Assessment (NAWQA) program, and climate data from the Oregon
 321 Climatic Service (OCS). We calibrated the model using the automatic cali-
 322 bration method described in Confessor and Whittaker (2007) and Whittaker
 323 et al. (2010). Figure 4 depicts the Calapooia watershed stream system.

324 4.2 The Pareto optimal tax policy

325 Due to USDA confidentiality restrictions, agricultural policy studies com-
326 monly model the decisions of a representative farm, and are applied to ag-
327 gregated production data. The USDA National Agricultural Statistics Ser-
328 vice (NASS) granted us access to detailed farm-level records from the 2002
329 Census of Agriculture with the confidentiality restriction that the data could
330 only be accessed from NASS computers.

331 The HGA requires parallel computation, and could not be run using
332 available NASS computing capability. To maintain the confidentiality of
333 individual producers, we constructed a synthetic data set from the original
334 records for application of the economic model. Fully synthetic data sets
335 are constructed by multiple imputation (Rubin, 1993) of all observations
336 for all variables in the data set, and are generally considered protection
337 against disclosure of confidential data. Bayesian networks provide a useful
338 method for imputation and creation of synthetic data sets, particularly in
339 high dimensions (Thibaudeau and Winkler, 2002; Di Zio et al., 2004).

340 The estimated Bayesian network satisfies the confidentiality restrictions
341 and can be copied to non-secured computers. We construct the synthetic
342 microdata for use in the DEA profit maximization model using constrained
343 draws from the Bayesian network. Our constructed synthetic microdata has
344 the same statistical properties as the original census records and protects
345 the confidentiality of the individual producers. The synthetic data were
346 also shown to generate the same results for the DEA profit maximization
347 model, which can be run in isolation using NASS computers, as the original

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Calapooia Synthetic Microdata

87 Obs.*	Mean	Min	Max	Std. Dev
Crop Sales (\$)	731,800.63	7,744.39	3,404,889.01	591,995.20
Acres	1,715.48	27.54	6,972.44	1,370.35
Labor	112,772.43	241.37	484,628.39	101,673.74
Fertilizer	92,911.99	6,524.38	342,890.26	72,011.17
Seed	16,903.00	4.58	104,308.10	21,278.89
Chemicals	60,243.97	27.21	565,094.90	90,974.07
Fuel	25,720.85	283.84	169,372.22	27,747.60
Utilities	13,392.67	0.00	82,088.85	14,950.13
Maintenance	43,410.06	21.20	159,912.51	37,177.90
Other Expenses	204,159.40	8,411.60	716,892.97	154,316.76

*Note, all input data with the exception of acreage is listed in expenditure form.

348 census records. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the input and
 349 output data listed in expenditure and revenue form, with the exception of
 350 acreage. According to NASS records, Nitrogen fertilizer sold for \$191/ton in
 351 2002, which implies that farms in our sample applied roughly 486.5 tons of
 352 fertilizer on average.

353 For the targeted tax policy HGA, we set up a population of 200 indi-
 354 viduals (the number of cluster nodes). Each individual genome consists of
 355 87 targeted tax rates, one for each farm in the watershed. The tax rate
 356 values range from 1 to 10, so that the optimal tax payments could range
 357 from 0 to up to 9 times the total fertilizer expenditure for a given farm. The
 358 HGA runs and tests the fitness of different individuals for their ability to
 359 simultaneously optimize both environmental and economic objectives. After
 360 several thousand generations, only the fittest solutions are retained and the
 361 resulting solutions approximate the Pareto optimal frontier.

362 Figure 5 depicts the Pareto optimal frontier for Nitrogen Loading and




Figure 5: The Pareto optimal frontier for the targeted tax policy

363 Profit at the basin level, summing over all 87 farms for the 200 individual
 364 candidate solutions to the targeted tax policy HGA.

365 4.3 Tradeoff results

366 The targeted tax policy HGA generates the Pareto optimal tax rate and
 367 corresponding profit-maximizing production decisions and Nitrogen loading
 368 for each of the 87 farms in each of the 200 individual cluster nodes in the
 369 parallel computation. This yields a data set of 17,400 simulated observations.
 370 For this second stage of analysis, where the profit-maximizing input and
 371 output quantities have already been chosen, we also combine some of the
 372 inputs to reduce the number of parameters that must be estimated.

373 For computational purposes, we convert each observation's input and
 374 output level to a mean-weighted amount. Weighting each input and output
 375 by its respective sample mean insures independence of unit of measurement
 376 (Shephard, 1970) and corrects for differences in scale.

Table 2: Calapooia Simulated Microdata and Distance Results

17,400 Obs.	Mean	Min	Max	Std. Dev
Acres	1,715.47	27.54	6,972.40	1,362.48
Labor Expenditures	112,772.43	241.37	484,628.39	101,090.62
Other Expenditures	363,829.96	19,981.10	977,014.99	232,010.46
Fertilizer (tons)	253.83	0	8,928.30	374.89
Crop Sales	734,068.28	0.47	2,834,500	573,605.17
Nitrogen Loading (lbs)	128,978.06	0	3,462,393.05	162,294.89
Distance	0.62	0.00	5.20	0.38
Tax rate	2.03	1	10	1.90
q elasticity	0.98	0.00	3.01	0.42
q price	5.58	0.00	17.11	2.39

377 Thus, the distance value for a hypothetical observation at the mean can
378 be interpreted as the percent increase in desirable output y_m^k and decrease
379 in undesirable output u_j^k required to reach the corresponding point $(y_m^{k*},$
380 $u_j^{k*})$ on the output frontier. The marginal effects of each output can then
381 be interpreted as percent changes in inefficiency, so that the shadow price
382 ratio provides a measure of the elasticity of the tradeoff between crop sales
383 and Nitrogen loading for each producer. The simulated microdata, Pareto
384 optimal tax rates, directional output distance function results and Nitrogen
385 loading shadow price ratios are summarized in Table 2.

386 The average Pareto optimal tax rate from the HGA is 2.03, or 2.03 times
387 the price of fertilizer. The market price of fertilizer in this study is \$191
388 per ton, making the average Pareto optimal fertilizer cost equal to roughly
389 \$380 per ton. Profit-maximizing fertilizer application decreases substantially,
390 falling from an average of 486.6 tons per farm to an average of 253.8 tons
391 per farm under the tax policy. While crop sales decrease for more than half
392 of the farms in our sample under the tax policy, average crop sales increase

393 slightly, from roughly \$732,000 to \$734,000 per farm. This is due to a shift
 394 in optimal production intensities under the tax policy and our estimate of
 395 the production technology for the basin.

396 The distance value of 0.62 suggests that on average, producers in the
 397 basin could increase their crop sales and decrease their Nitrogen loading by
 398 62 percent from mean levels, based on the production levels of other farms
 399 in the basin. For a hypothetical observation at the mean, this corresponds
 400 to a feasible reduction of roughly 80,000 lbs. of Nitrogen loading and an
 401 increase of roughly \$450,000 in crop sales. We caution that differences in
 402 location within the basin stream system, as well as unobserved differences in
 403 soil quality may be driving these relatively high estimated inefficiencies.

404 Along the frontier, the tradeoff between crop sales and Nitrogen loading,
 405 measured in elasticity form, is close to one on average. This implies that
 406 on average, a one percent reduction in Nitrogen loading (from mean levels)
 407 corresponds to a one percent reduction in crop sales (from mean levels). To
 408 convert this value to monetary terms,

$$q = -p \frac{\partial \vec{D}_O(x, y, u); g_y, g_u / \partial u \bar{y}}{\partial \vec{D}_O(x, y, u); g_y, g_u / \partial y \bar{u}}. \quad (18)$$

409 The desirable output, grass seed sales, is measured in dollars, so that the
 410 price for an additional dollar of grass seed sales, p , is normalized to equal
 411 \$1.00. Thus, the average estimate for the shadow price of Nitrogen loading,
 412 q , in monetary terms is \$ 5.58 per lb., and q ranges from 0.00 to \$17.11 per
 413 lb. across individual producers. These values should be interpreted with
 414 caution, particularly given that they are derived from simulated outcomes.




Figure 6: Distribution of Nitrogen Loading Shadow Price Elasticities

415 They do however shed some light on the possible range of values for Nitrogen
 416 loading in the basin, as well as how these values vary across the farms.

417 Figure 6 illustrates the distribution of estimated tradeoff elasticities.
 418 Elasticity values lie between 0.5 and 1.5 for the majority of observations
 419 in our sample. For relatively inelastic observations, a one percent reduction
 420 in Nitrogen loading corresponds to more than a one percent reduction in crop
 421 sales. The opportunity cost of reductions to Nitrogen loading is greatest for
 422 these farms under the tax policy. Several factors could explain a more in-
 423 elastic tradeoff. These farms may be situated on more productive land in the
 424 basin, on land where applied fertilizer is less apt to run off due to gradient
 425 conditions, or they may also be located at a point in the stream network
 426 where runoff has less of an effect on basin-level Nitrogen loading.

427 All of these are important to consider from a policy perspective. For

428 instance, it may be desirable to target incentives for additional best man-
429 agement practices, such as buffer strips, to these farms given that their re-
430 ductions in Nitrogen loading that rely on decreased fertilizer usage alone are
431 so costly. At the other end of the distribution, for farms where the tradeoff
432 is relatively elastic, a one percent reduction in Nitrogen loading corresponds
433 to much less than a one percent reduction in sales. These farms may be sit-
434 uated on less productive land, on land where applied fertilizer is more likely
435 to run off, or at a point in the stream network where runoff has more of an
436 effect on Nitrogen loading in the basin. From a policy perspective, it may be
437 desirable to target additional incentives for land retirement to these farms.

438 5 Conclusion

439 The tradeoff between agricultural production and water quality is widely ac-
440 knowledged. The effectiveness of any policy incentive to address this prob-
441 lem depends not only on how farmers respond, but also on the physical
442 relationship between their production activities and the surrounding water-
443 shed. Recent computational advances allow for simultaneous consideration
444 of both questions, enabling more complete policy analysis. In this study, we
445 take just such an integrated approach by developing a hybrid genetic algo-
446 rithm to solve for an optimal tax policy that jointly maximizes agricultural
447 profit and minimizes basin-level Nitrogen loading. Our framework advances
448 the integrated economic and biophysical literature by incorporating realistic
449 models of both farm production and the basin hydrology, by more freely
450 optimizing over both objectives, and by fully endogenizing economic cost

451 without imposing an *a priori* production technology.

452 We then use our framework to better understand the tradeoffs that result
453 at the farm level under the prospective tax policy. Working with a set of grass
454 seed farms from Oregon’s Calapooia River watershed, we estimate an aver-
455 age shadow price of \$5.58/lb. for Nitrogen loading, providing information
456 on the cost to farmers of decreasing current loadings in the basin. We also
457 find that this tradeoff varies across farms, from relatively elastic for some
458 to relatively inelastic for others. The distribution of tradeoff values likely
459 depends on several factors, including differences in soil productivity, topog-
460 raphy, and location in the basin’s hydrological network. This suggests the
461 need for more adaptive management policies in conjunction with the fertil-
462 izer tax, such as incentives for the use of best management practices on more
463 productive working land and taking some marginal, or critically-located land
464 out of production altogether. The distribution of tradeoff values would also
465 likely affect the feasibility of implementing these policies in practice. For in-
466 stance, a policy that concentrates Nitrogen reduction costs among producers
467 in one are of the basin may be less feasible than one that would spread costs
468 more evenly across the watershed. Individual tradeoff values could be used
469 to assess the distributional implications of prospective agri-environmental
470 policies.

471 It is important to also note the limitations of this study. Perhaps most
472 importantly, we focus on a single fertilizer reduction policy. A more realistic
473 analysis would consider a range of policies to address Nitrogen loading, in-
474 cluding best management practices and land retirement. Allowing for more
475 policy options would likely lower the overall cost of Nitrogen reduction. Our

476 framework does not preclude multiple policies. One can add multiple pol-
477 icy incentives to the profit maximization problem and use SWAT to model
478 their physical effects. Here we focus on the overall framework to endogenize
479 policy response, and leave the question of multiple policies for a separate
480 application. We also do not attempt to estimate the causal determinants
481 of tradeoff differences across farms. Likely determinants include on-farm
482 practices, topographical characteristics and location in the basin system. A
483 better understanding of how these factors affect tradeoff differences would
484 be useful for targeting policies in practice.

485 While our application focuses on a small agricultural watershed in the
486 Pacific Northwest, this framework could be adapted to analyze environ-
487 mental tradeoffs for larger and more policy-relevant watersheds, in both
488 the U.S. and internationally. It is also possible to expand the analysis to
489 include additional environmental objectives, such as biodiversity measures
490 or water flow by using the HGA approach. This framework could also be
491 adapted to model changing environmental tradeoffs over time, in response
492 to a variety of factors, including efficiency and technology change, prospec-
493 tive agri-environmental policies, changing development patterns, commodity
494 price changes, or projected climate change.

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498 All data used, including the HGA results used to calculate the individual

499 tradeoffs, are available from the authors upon request.

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